Lower equilibrium payoffs in two-player repeated games with non- observable actions

DOI10.1007/BF01248496zbMath0675.90109MaRDI QIDQ1122519

Ehud Lehrer

Publication date: 1989

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

non-observable actions; one-shot game; lower equilibrium payoffs; undiscounted repeated game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A20: Multistage and repeated games

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Cites Work

• Two-Player Repeated Games with Nonobservable Actions and Observable Payoffs
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