Approximate implementation in Markovian environments

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.07.009MaRDI QIDQ900435zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ludovic Renou, Tristan Tomala

Publication date 22 December 2015

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.07.009

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencydynamicMarkov processesimplementationmechanism designundetectability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of Markov chains and discrete-time Markov processes on general state spaces (social mobility, learning theory, industrial processes, etc.) (60J20) Social choice (91B14) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Dynamic games (91A25)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 18893 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3205836 (Why is no real title available?)
• A new approach to the implementation problem
• An Approach to Communication Equilibria
• Complexity and repeated implementation
• Dynamic sender-receiver games
• Efficiency in games with Markovian private information
• Efficient repeated implementation
• Hoeffding's inequality for uniformly ergodic Markov chains
• Lower equilibrium payoffs in two-player repeated games with non- observable actions
• Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship
• Multistage Games with Communication
• Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions
• Prediction, Learning, and Games
• Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting
• Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium

Cited in

(7)

• Unraveling in a repeated moral hazard model with multiple agents
• Implementation in generic environments
• Repeated implementation: a practical characterization
• Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: an equivalence
• Shannon meets Myerson: information extraction from a strategic sender
• Cooperation dynamics in repeated games of adverse selection
• Codes of conduct, private information and repeated games

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