Efficiency in Games With Markovian Private Information
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Publication:2871442
DOI10.3982/ECTA9557zbMath1291.91025OpenAlexW1847667923MaRDI QIDQ2871442
Publication date: 7 January 2014
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta9557
Markov chains (discrete-time Markov processes on discrete state spaces) (60J10) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
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Efficient allocations in economies with asymmetric information when the realized frequency of types is common knowledge ⋮ Relational contracts in a persistent environment ⋮ Dynamic communication with biased senders ⋮ Discounted quotas ⋮ Unraveling in a repeated moral hazard model with multiple agents ⋮ Prior‐free dynamic allocation under limited liability ⋮ Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring ⋮ Approximate implementation in Markovian environments ⋮ The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring ⋮ Weighted utility optimization of the participating endowment contract ⋮ Efficient chip strategies in repeated games ⋮ Efficient cooperation by exchanging favors ⋮ Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags ⋮ Cooperation dynamics in repeated games of adverse selection ⋮ Signaling and tacit collusion in an infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma ⋮ Optimal dynamic information provision ⋮ Markov Games with Frequent Actions and Incomplete Information—The Limit Case ⋮ Collusion and turnover in experience goods markets ⋮ Efficient dark markets
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