Dynamic communication with biased senders
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Publication:1651248
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.10.017zbMath1400.91052OpenAlexW2767920882MaRDI QIDQ1651248
Publication date: 12 July 2018
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://hdl.handle.net/2144/35942
Related Items (8)
Goodwill in communication ⋮ Starting small to communicate ⋮ Multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfers ⋮ Dynamic delegation with a persistent state ⋮ Repeated communication with private lying costs ⋮ The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders ⋮ Crying about a strategic wolf: a theory of crime and warning ⋮ On the value of repetition for communication games
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- Multistage Games with Communication
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
- The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
- Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games
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