Dynamic communication with biased senders

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.10.017zbMath1400.91052OpenAlexW2767920882MaRDI QIDQ1651248

Alex Smolin, Chiara Margaria

Publication date: 12 July 2018

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://hdl.handle.net/2144/35942

zbMATH Keywords

communicationrepeated gamesfolk theoremBayesian games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (8)

Goodwill in communication ⋮ Starting small to communicate ⋮ Multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfers ⋮ Dynamic delegation with a persistent state ⋮ Repeated communication with private lying costs ⋮ The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders ⋮ Crying about a strategic wolf: a theory of crime and warning ⋮ On the value of repetition for communication games

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Discounted quotas
• Dynamic sender-receiver games
• Efficiency in Games With Markovian Private Information
• Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions
• Multistage Games with Communication
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games

This page was built for publication: Dynamic communication with biased senders