Dynamic sender-receiver games
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Publication:1945834
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2012.07.006zbMath1275.91026arXiv1204.0323OpenAlexW1973727764MaRDI QIDQ1945834
Eilon Solan, Nicolas Vieille, Jérôme Renault
Publication date: 17 April 2013
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1204.0323
Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
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