Unraveling in a repeated moral hazard model with multiple agents

DOI10.3982/TE833MaRDI QIDQ4586079zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Madhav Chandrasekher

Publication date 11 September 2018

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te833

zbMATH Keywords

communicationrepeated gamescollusionstatistical testing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1713116 (Why is no real title available?)
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• Blackwell optimality in Markov decision processes with partial observation.
• Computing uniformly optimal strategies in two-player stochastic games
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• Dynamic sender-receiver games
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• Efficiency in partnerships with joint monitoring
• Equilibria in repeated games of incomplete information: the general symmetric case.
• Game theory. Translated from the Hebrew by Ziv Hellman and edited by Mike Borns
• Implementing action profiles when agents collude
• Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations
• Moral hazard and renegotiation with multiple agents
• Noncooperative Stochastic Games
• Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
• Perfect information stochastic games and related classes
• Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting
• Stopping agents from ``cheating
• Three-Player Absorbing Games
• Two-player stochastic games. I: A reduction
• Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents

Cited in

(5)

• A simple forecasting mechanism for moral hazard settings
• On multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard
• Repeated moral hazard with effort persistence
• Moral hazard and renegotiation with multiple agents
• Collusion and turnover in experience goods markets

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