Unraveling in a repeated moral hazard model with multiple agents

DOI10.3982/TE833zbMATH Open1395.91043OpenAlexW1570017940MaRDI QIDQ4586079FDOQ4586079

Authors: Madhav Chandrasekher 

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te833

Recommendations

• Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: the case of risk-neutrality
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zbMATH Keywords

communicationrepeated gamescollusionstatistical testing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Perfect information stochastic games and related classes
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• Dynamic sender-receiver games
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• Stopping agents from ``cheating
• Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations
• Equilibria in repeated games of incomplete information: the general symmetric case.
• Approximate implementation in Markovian environments
• Implementing action profiles when agents collude
• Efficiency in partnerships with joint monitoring
• Moral hazard and renegotiation with multiple agents

Cited In (5)

• On multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard
• Repeated moral hazard with effort persistence
• Moral hazard and renegotiation with multiple agents
• Collusion and turnover in experience goods markets
• A simple forecasting mechanism for moral hazard settings

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