REPEATED MORAL HAZARD AND CONTRACTS WITH MEMORY: THE CASE OF RISK‐NEUTRALITY*
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Publication:4619993
DOI10.1111/j.1468-2354.2012.00687.xzbMath1420.91141OpenAlexW2155384418WikidataQ56213603 ScholiaQ56213603MaRDI QIDQ4619993
Susanne Ohlendorf, Patrick W. Schmitz
Publication date: 7 February 2019
Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-285650
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Peer effects and incentives ⋮ Salience bias and overwork ⋮ The option value of record-based sanctions ⋮ Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: a laboratory experiment ⋮ Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted ⋮ Self-organizing teams ⋮ Incomplete contracts, limited liability, and the optimality of joint ownership ⋮ Attorney fees in repeated relationships ⋮ Job design with sequential tasks and outcome externalities revisited
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