Job design with sequential tasks and outcome externalities revisited

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2014.09.023MaRDI QIDQ2345158zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jiancai Pi

Publication date 19 May 2015

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.09.023

zbMATH Keywords

conflicting tasksjob designlimited liabilitymoral hazardoutcome externalitiessequential actions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Recommendations

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Cites work

• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• Public procurement in times of crisis: the bundling decision reconsidered
• Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: the case of risk-neutrality

Cited in

(4)

• Incomplete contracts, limited liability, and the optimality of joint ownership
• Dynamic moral hazard with sequential tasks
• Salience bias and overwork
• Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted

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