Salience bias and overwork

DOI10.3390/G13010015MaRDI QIDQ2669175zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Fabio Römeis, Fabian Herweg, Daniel Müller

Publication date 9 March 2022

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/g13010015

zbMATH Keywords

context-dependent preferenceshidden actionmoral hazardoverworksalience theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites work

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• Salience theory of choice under risk
• Settling with salience-biased defendants
• The Achilles' heel of salience theory and a way to fix it
• Wage floors, imperfect performance measures, and optimal job design

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