Contracting with Diversely Naive Agents
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Publication:5488494
Recommendations
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Cited in
(34)- Salience bias and overwork
- On incentives, temptation and self-control
- Closed-loop equilibrium strategies for general time-inconsistent optimal control problems
- Strategic information suppression in borrowing and pre-lending cognition: theory and evidence
- Endogenous preferences and dynamic contract design
- Consumer exploitation and notice periods
- Cheap talk with coarse understanding
- The hyperbolic factor: a measure of time inconsistency
- Life insurance and life settlement markets with overconfident policyholders
- Mechanism design with level-k types: theory and an application to bilateral trade
- Screening with Frames: Implementation in Extensive Form
- Efficient mechanisms for level-\(k\) bilateral trading
- Fishing for fools
- Intertemporal price discrimination with time-inconsistent consumers
- Do sellers exploit biased beliefs of buyers? An experiment
- A theory of intermediated investment with hyperbolic discounting investors
- Dual random utility maximisation
- A solvable time-inconsistent principal-agent problem
- Bargaining over bets
- Mood-driven choices and self-regulation
- Contracting with a naïve time-inconsistent agent: to exploit or not to exploit?
- Price discrimination with loss averse consumers
- Cigarette taxes with endogenous addictiveness
- Multi-task agency with unawareness
- On the identification of changing tastes
- Temptation, horizontal differentiation and monopoly pricing
- Consumer heterogeneity and surplus under two-part pricing
- Present bias in the labor market -- when it pays to be naive
- Screening with privacy on (im)persistency
- Misperception and cognition in markets
- Screening of possibly incompetent agents
- Commitment and partial naïveté: early withdrawal penalties on retirement accounts
- Naiveté and sophistication in dynamic inconsistency
- Long-term contracting with time-inconsistent agents
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