Contracting with Diversely Naive Agents
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Publication:5488494
DOI10.1111/j.1467-937X.2006.00392.xzbMath1145.91362OpenAlexW3123500216MaRDI QIDQ5488494
Publication date: 22 September 2006
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2006.00392.x
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