Contracting with Diversely Naive Agents
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Publication:5488494
DOI10.1111/J.1467-937X.2006.00392.XzbMATH Open1145.91362OpenAlexW3123500216MaRDI QIDQ5488494FDOQ5488494
Authors: Kfir Eliaz, Ran Spiegler 
Publication date: 22 September 2006
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2006.00392.x
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- Strategic information suppression in borrowing and pre-lending cognition: theory and evidence
- Consumer heterogeneity and surplus under two-part pricing
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- Consumer exploitation and notice periods
- Screening with Frames: Implementation in Extensive Form
- Cheap talk with coarse understanding
- Misperception and cognition in markets
- Naiveté and sophistication in dynamic inconsistency
- Mechanism design with level-k types: theory and an application to bilateral trade
- A theory of intermediated investment with hyperbolic discounting investors
- Dual random utility maximisation
- On the identification of changing tastes
- Closed-loop equilibrium strategies for general time-inconsistent optimal control problems
- Mood-driven choices and self-regulation
- Efficient mechanisms for level-\(k\) bilateral trading
- Do sellers exploit biased beliefs of buyers? An experiment
- Screening of possibly incompetent agents
- Salience bias and overwork
- Intertemporal price discrimination with time-inconsistent consumers
- Cigarette taxes with endogenous addictiveness
- Present bias in the labor market -- when it pays to be naive
- Temptation, horizontal differentiation and monopoly pricing
- Life insurance and life settlement markets with overconfident policyholders
- Contracting with a naïve time-inconsistent agent: to exploit or not to exploit?
- Multi-task agency with unawareness
- Commitment and partial naïveté: early withdrawal penalties on retirement accounts
- Bargaining over bets
- A solvable time-inconsistent principal-agent problem
- On incentives, temptation and self-control
- Endogenous preferences and dynamic contract design
- The hyperbolic factor: a measure of time inconsistency
- Fishing for fools
- Price discrimination with loss averse consumers
- Screening with privacy on (im)persistency
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