Screening of possibly incompetent agents

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2015.07.016zbMATH Open1394.91260OpenAlexW1040245003MaRDI QIDQ1663947FDOQ1663947

Authors Nina Baranchuk, Philip H. Dybvig

Publication date 24 August 2018

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.07.016

zbMATH Keywords

screeningagencydisagreementprior beliefs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Theory of organizations, manpower planning in operations research (90B70)

Recommendations

• Career concerns and performance reporting in optimal incentive contracts
• Optimal contracting with private knowledge of wealth and ability
• Screening ethics when honest agents keep their word
• Contracting with Diversely Naive Agents
• The virtue of being underestimated: A note on discriminatory contracts in hidden information models

Cites work

• Delegated portfolio management

Cited in

(2)

• Imperfect evaluation in project screening
• Screening ethics when honest agents keep their word

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