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Cites work
Cited in
(22)- A monopolistic market for information
- The principal/agent paradigm: Its relevance to various functional fields
- Multi-period information markets
- Screening of possibly incompetent agents
- Delegated portfolio management under ambiguity aversion
- Optimism bias, portfolio delegation, and economic welfare
- Reward schemes
- Asset pricing under optimal contracts
- Contracting to compete for flows
- Transferable deposits as a screening mechanism
- A cooperative bargaining framework for decentralized portfolio optimization
- Optimal portfolio with power utility of absolute and relative wealth
- The possibility of informationally efficient markets
- Reservation wage and optimal contract for experts
- Management compensation and market timing under portfolio constraints
- Preferences and beliefs in a sequential social dilemma: a within-subjects analysis
- Static and dynamic VaR constrained portfolios with application to delegated portfolio management
- Belief elicitation in experiments: Is there a hedging problem?
- Optimal fund menus
- Corporate portfolio management
- How nonlinear benchmark in delegation contract can affect asset price and price informativeness
- Information acquisition and mutual funds
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