Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
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Cited in
(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Committees, sequential voting and transparency
- A theory of political cycles
- Discretionary rewards as a feedback mechanism
- Reputational cheap talk with misunderstanding
- Delegated portfolio management
- Herding over the career
- Voting in the limelight
- Intertemporal incentives under loss aversion
- Staged financing: a trade-off theory of holdup and option value
- Minority perception of exclusion and promotion hurdles
- Discretionary acquisition of firm-specific human capital under non-verifiable performance
- Preselection and expert advice
- Experimentation with reputation concerns -- dynamic signalling with changing types
- Managing intrinsic motivation in a long-run relationship
- Incentive mechanism design aiming at deflated performance manipulation in retail firms: based on the ratchet effect and the reputation effect
- Dynamic contracting under imperfect public information and asymmetric beliefs
- Creating confusion
- Reputation and earnings dynamics
- Political selection and the optimal concentration of political power
- When voters like to be right : an analysis of the Condorcet jury theorem with mixed motives
- Reputation and the ``need for enemies
- Information manipulation and competition
- Risk aversion, managerial reputation, and debt-equity conflict
- Managerial reputation, risk-taking, and imperfect capital markets
- Simple equilibria in general contests
- Starting small to communicate
- Learning, belief manipulation and optimal relationship termination
- Investment timing, agency and overconfidence
- Reputation and news suppression in the media industry
- Private vs. public communication: difference of opinion and reputational concerns
- Working to learn
- Collusion and turnover in experience goods markets
- Capital immobility and the reach for yield
- Committees with leaks
- A dynamic model of certification and reputation
- Disappearance of reputations in two-sided incomplete-information games
- Term limits and bounds on policy responsiveness in dynamic elections
- Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships
- Signal jamming in pretrial negotiation with multiple defendants
- On the drawbacks of large committees
- Will truth out? -- An advisor's quest to appear competent
- Too good to be truthful: why competent advisers are fired
- The curse of long horizons
- Identification and \(\sqrt N\)-consistent estimation of a nonlinear panel data model with correlated unobserved effects
- Imperfect memory and choice under risk
- Mixed up? That's good for motivation
- Learning, diversification and the nature of risk
- Reputation and impermanent types
- Professional advice
- Renegotiation and dynamic inconsistency: contracting with non-exponential discounting
- Management turnover, strategic ambiguity and supply incentives
- Transparency, career concerns, and incentives for acquiring expertise
- The benefits of aggregate performance metrics in the presence of career concerns
- Competition and the strategic choice of managerial incentives: the relative performance case
- Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors
- Coordination under the shadow of career concerns
- Dynamic costs and moral hazard: a duality-based approach
- Managerial Incentives and Corporate Fraud: The Sources of Incentives Matter*
- Design, analysis and simulation of an optimal wage contract in firms
- Bounded memory and permanent reputations
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1229525 (Why is no real title available?)
- The Economics of Career Concerns, Part II: Application to Missions and Accountability of Government Agencies
- Myopic Investment Decisions and Competitive Labor Markets
- Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition
- Stochastic programming perspective on the agency problems under uncertainty
- Optimal adaptive testing: informativeness and incentives
- Dynamic risk taking with bonus schemes
- Occurrence of deception under the oversight of a regulator having reputation concerns
- Reputation effects
- Managerial Incentives, Investment and Aggregate Implications: Scale Effects
- Propaganda and credulity
- Committee design with endogenous participation
- Sustainable reputations with rating systems
- Quality distortions in vertical relations
- On the efficiency of markets for managers
- Reasonable doubt
- Monotone contracts
- ADVERSE SELECTION, LEARNING, AND COMPETITIVE SEARCH
- Economic uncertainty and structural reforms: Evidence from stock market volatility
- Managerial Quality and Productivity Dynamics
- The ratchet effect: a learning perspective
- Multiple prizes in tournaments with career concerns
- Signaling drive over the long term
- Data and incentives
- Repeated matching, career concerns, and firm size
- Manager fee contracts and managerial incentives
- Performance cycles
- Multiple Testing and the Distributional Effects of Accountability Incentives in Education
- Impermanent types and permanent reputations
- Reputation, learning and project choice in frictional economies
- Information externalities in corporate governance
- Debt ceilings with fiscal intransparency and imperfect electoral accountability
- Hierarchies and promotions in political institutions: accountability and selection
- Information design in the principal-agent problem
- Actions and signals
- Signalling with private monitoring
- Do workers benefit from wage transparency rules??
- On the impact of information manipulation in democratic elections
- The economics of career concerns in teamwork
- Perverse ethical concerns: misinformation and coordination
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