Dynamic contracting under imperfect public information and asymmetric beliefs
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Publication:1994202
DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2013.08.001zbMath1402.91252OpenAlexW3125488962MaRDI QIDQ1994202
Publication date: 1 November 2018
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2013.08.001
hidden actionshidden statesasymmetric beliefsdynamic principal-agent modelsimperfect public information
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Moral hazard under ambiguity ⋮ Staged venture capital investment considering unexpected major events ⋮ Do time preferences matter in intertemporal consumption and portfolio decisions?
Cites Work
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