Incentives, CEO compensation, and shareholder wealth in a dynamic agency model
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Publication:1371188
DOI10.1006/JETH.1997.2293zbMath0883.90024OpenAlexW2079801567MaRDI QIDQ1371188
Publication date: 28 October 1997
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2293
Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Theory of organizations, manpower planning in operations research (90B70)
Related Items (4)
Termination of dynamic contracts in an equilibrium labor market model ⋮ Dynamic contracting under imperfect public information and asymmetric beliefs ⋮ Stock grants as a commitment device ⋮ When to fire a CEO: optimal termination in dynamic contracts
Cites Work
- Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem
- Repeated moral hazard and one-sided commitment
- On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
- Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
- Computing Multi-Period, Information-Constrained Optima
- On Efficient Distribution with Private Information
- Incentives and Aggregate Shocks
- Dynamic Insurance with Private Information and Balanced Budgets
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