Dynamic Insurance with Private Information and Balanced Budgets

DOI10.2307/2298078MaRDI QIDQ4883970zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Cheng Wang

Publication date 13 October 1996

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/ff3cf7a377290501312c3be8ae69d6e3fbd19fdb

zbMATH Keywords

Bellman equationbilateral asymmetric informationbalanced budgetsdynamic insurance problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic growth models (91B62)

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Cited in

(22)

• Dynamic mechanism design with hidden income and hidden actions
• Money and dynamic credit arrangements with private information
• Optimal self-enforcement and termination
• Optimal self-financing microfinance contracts when borrowers have risk aversion and limited commitment
• Dynamic consistency of insurance contracts under enforcement by exclusion
• Outside opportunities and termination
• On the long run implications of repeated moral hazard
• Solving dynamic public insurance games with endogenous agent distributions: theory and computational approximation
• Restricted feedback in long term relationships
• On Ramsey's conjecture: efficient allocations in the neoclassical growth model with private information
• Non-exclusive dynamic contracts, competition, and the limits of insurance
• The importance of the number of different agents in a heterogeneous asset-pricing model
• Termination of dynamic contracts in an equilibrium labor market model
• From equals to despots: the dynamics of repeated decision making in partnerships with private information
• Incentives, CEO compensation, and shareholder wealth in a dynamic agency model
• Payments systems design in deterministic and private information environments
• A recursive formulation for repeated agency with history dependence
• Risk sharing contracts with private information and one-sided commitment
• Termination as an incentive device
• Dynamic risk-sharing with two-sided moral hazard
• Aggregate fluctuations, interest rates, and repeated insurance under private information
• Investment and bilateral insurance

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