Money and dynamic credit arrangements with private information
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Publication:1572944
DOI10.1006/jeth.1999.2620zbMath0952.91030OpenAlexW2147380362MaRDI QIDQ1572944
Stephen D. Williamson, S. Rao Aiyagari
Publication date: 6 August 2000
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/0530d82bcc18010a704dcb820945673943edc2fd
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Related Items (11)
Outside versus inside bonds: a Modigliani-Miller type result for liquidity constrained economies ⋮ Credit and inflation under borrower's lack of commitment ⋮ A dynamic model of unsecured credit ⋮ Debt enforcement and the value of money ⋮ Optimal lending contracts with long run borrowing constraints ⋮ Inflation, Self Insurance and the Friedman Rule in Economies with Uninsurable Idiosyncratic Risks ⋮ Money and credit with limited commitment and theft ⋮ Payments systems design in deterministic and private information environments ⋮ Money, credit and banking ⋮ A NOTE ON THE ROBUSTNESS OF THE TOBIN EFFECT IN INCOMPLETE MARKETS ⋮ MONEY, MARKETS, AND DYNAMIC CREDIT
Cites Work
- Repeated principal-agent relationships with lending and borrowing
- Liquidity and interest rates
- Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem
- Efficiency and equality in a simple model of efficient unemployment insurance
- Repeated moral hazard and one-sided commitment
- A Difficulty with the Optimum Quantity of Money
- On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
- Computing Multi-Period, Information-Constrained Optima
- On Efficient Distribution with Private Information
- Currency and Credit are Equivalent Mechanisms
- Dynamic Insurance with Private Information and Balanced Budgets
- Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment
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