Money and dynamic credit arrangements with private information

DOI10.1006/JETH.1999.2620MaRDI QIDQ1572944zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors S. Rao Aiyagari, Stephen D. Williamson

Publication date 6 August 2000

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/0530d82bcc18010a704dcb820945673943edc2fd

zbMATH Keywords

defection constraintsdynamic contractsfinancial marketinflation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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Cites work

• A Difficulty with the Optimum Quantity of Money
• Computing Multi-Period, Information-Constrained Optima
• Currency and Credit are Equivalent Mechanisms
• Dynamic Insurance with Private Information and Balanced Budgets
• Efficiency and equality in a simple model of efficient unemployment insurance
• Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment
• Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem
• Liquidity and interest rates
• On Efficient Distribution with Private Information
• On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
• Repeated moral hazard and one-sided commitment
• Repeated principal-agent relationships with lending and borrowing

Cited in

(21)

• Optimal monetary interventions in credit markets
• Limited participation, private money, and credit in a spatial model of money
• Money and storage in a differential information economy
• Optimal lending contracts with long run borrowing constraints
• Money, markets, and dynamic credit
• Money, credit, and limited participation
• Inflation, Self Insurance and the Friedman Rule in Economies with Uninsurable Idiosyncratic Risks
• Currency and Credit are Equivalent Mechanisms
• Money and Information
• Debt enforcement and the value of money
• Limited participation, private money, and credit in a spatial model of money
• A NOTE ON THE ROBUSTNESS OF THE TOBIN EFFECT IN INCOMPLETE MARKETS
• Financial Cryptography and Data Security
• Private information, money, and growth: Indeterminacy, fluctuations, and the Mundell-Tobin effect
• Payments systems design in deterministic and private information environments
• Outside versus inside bonds: a Modigliani-Miller type result for liquidity constrained economies
• Credit and inflation under borrower's lack of commitment
• A dynamic model of unsecured credit
• Search, money, and inflation under private information
• Money and credit with limited commitment and theft
• Money, credit and banking

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