A dynamic model of unsecured credit

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2011.05.016zbMath1255.91420MaRDI QIDQ643266

Daniel Sanches

Publication date: 28 October 2011

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/frbp/assets/working-papers/2011/wp11-2.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic contracting; debt forgiveness; delayed settlement; initial cost of lending; unsecured loans

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91G40: Credit risk

Cites Work

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