Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment
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Publication:5689655
DOI10.2307/2297795zbMath0864.90023OpenAlexW2100037494MaRDI QIDQ5689655
Publication date: 7 January 1997
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297795
Related Items (51)
On the optimality of monetary trading ⋮ Markov-perfect risk sharing, moral hazard and limited commitment ⋮ On the computation of value correspondences for dynamic games ⋮ Optimal dynamic risk sharing when enforcement is a decision variable ⋮ Optimal long-term contracts with disability insurance under limited commitment ⋮ Differentiability of the value function without interiority assumptions ⋮ Optimal bankruptcy code: a fresh start for some ⋮ Optimal monetary policy in a New Keynesian model with heterogeneous expectations ⋮ Public versus private provision of liquidity: is there a trade-off? ⋮ Even up: maintaining relationships ⋮ Endogenous debt constraints in a life-cycle model with an application to social security ⋮ Ex ante payments in self-enforcing risk-sharing contracts ⋮ On the benefits of currency reform ⋮ Public information in Markov games ⋮ A protocol for repeated bargaining ⋮ Stochastic stability of monotone economies in regenerative environments ⋮ Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design ⋮ A duality approach to continuous-time contracting problems with limited commitment ⋮ Termination of dynamic contracts in an equilibrium labor market model ⋮ Collateral premia and risk sharing under limited commitment ⋮ Asset prices, debt constraints and inefficiency ⋮ The optimal degree of monetary discretion in a new Keynesian model with private information ⋮ When can we do better than autarky? ⋮ Credit and inflation under borrower's lack of commitment ⋮ A dynamic model of unsecured credit ⋮ Optimal risk sharing and borrowing constraints in a continuous-time model with limited commitment ⋮ Optimal self-financing microfinance contracts when borrowers have risk aversion and limited commitment ⋮ Equilibrium in collateralized asset markets: credit contractions and negative equity loans ⋮ Dynamic risk-sharing with two-sided moral hazard ⋮ Optimal self-enforcement and termination ⋮ Entrepreneurship and firm heterogeneity with limited enforcement ⋮ Does risk sharing increase with risk aversion and risk when commitment is limited? ⋮ Indeterminacy in credit economies ⋮ Dynamic relational contracts under complete information ⋮ Contract enforcement and the size of the informal economy ⋮ Risk sharing through financial markets with endogenous enforcement of trades ⋮ Stock grants as a commitment device ⋮ Informal insurance in social networks ⋮ Risk-sharing networks and farsighted stability ⋮ Competitive equilibria with limited enforcement ⋮ Endogenous borrowing constraints and stagnation in Latin America ⋮ Public versus private risk sharing ⋮ Power fluctuations and political economy ⋮ Money and credit with limited commitment and theft ⋮ A New Keynesian model with heterogeneous expectations ⋮ Self-enforcement, heterogeneous agents, and long-run survival ⋮ Money and dynamic credit arrangements with private information ⋮ Risk sharing contracts with private information and one-sided commitment ⋮ Outside opportunities and termination ⋮ Lotteries, sunspots, and incentive constraints ⋮ Default and efficient debt markets.
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