Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment
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Publication:5689655
DOI10.2307/2297795zbMath0864.90023MaRDI QIDQ5689655
Publication date: 7 January 1997
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297795
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