Optimal dynamic risk sharing when enforcement is a decision variable

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.03.002zbMath1156.91398OpenAlexW3122690104MaRDI QIDQ2373766

Thorsten V. Koeppl

Publication date: 16 July 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/152716

zbMATH Keywords

risk sharinglimited commitmentthird-party enforcement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items

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