Optimal dynamic risk sharing when enforcement is a decision variable

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2006.03.002MaRDI QIDQ2373766zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Thorsten V. Koeppl

Publication date 16 July 2007

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10419/152716

zbMATH Keywords

limited commitmentrisk sharingthird-party enforcement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Recommendations

• Sharing risk efficiently under suboptimal punishments for defection
• Dynamic risk-sharing with two-sided moral hazard
• Pool size and the sustainability of optimal risk-sharing agreements
• Dynamic costly state verification
• Risk sharing through financial markets with endogenous enforcement of trades

Cites work

• Debt Constrained Asset Markets
• Dynamic programming solution of incentive constrained problems
• Ex ante payments in self-enforcing risk-sharing contracts
• Group Formation in Risk-Sharing Arrangements
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 52448 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3307201 (Why is no real title available?)
• Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment
• Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies
• On Modes of Economic Governance
• On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
• Optimal Contracts when Enforcement is a Decision Variable
• Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
• Repeated moral hazard and one-sided commitment
• Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts

Cited in

(13)

• Risk sharing and information revelation mechanism of a one-manufacturer and one-retailer supply chain facing an integrated competitor
• Dynamic consistency of insurance contracts under enforcement by exclusion
• Pool size and the sustainability of optimal risk-sharing agreements
• Market games with asymmetric information: the core
• Efficient contract enforcement
• Sharing risk efficiently under suboptimal punishments for defection
• Consumer default with complete markets: default-based pricing and finite punishment
• Enforcement frictions and optimal lending contracts
• Martingale properties of self-enforcing debt
• Do lack of transparency and enforcement undermine international risk-sharing?
• Costly monitoring, dynamic incentives, and default
• Endogenous groups and dynamic selection in mechanism design
• Risk sharing through financial markets with endogenous enforcement of trades

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