Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
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Publication:3040874
DOI10.2307/1911459zbMath0526.90015OpenAlexW2172441529MaRDI QIDQ3040874
Edward C. Prescott, Robert M. Townsend
Publication date: 1984
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs42069.pdf
moral hazardadverse selectionlotteriescompetitive equilibriaPareto optimamoral-hazard insurance economyprivate-information labor market economysignaling economy
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