Ex ante efficiency implies incentive compatibility

DOI10.1007/s00199-007-0261-4zbMath1154.91583OpenAlexW2139209362MaRDI QIDQ926232

Nicholas C. Yannelis, Yeneng Sun

Publication date: 26 May 2008

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0261-4

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto efficiencyExact law of large numbersAsymmetric informationIncentive compatibilityNegligible private informationStrong conditional independence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic models in economics (91B70)

Related Items (15)

Monte Carlo sampling processes and incentive compatible allocations in large economies ⋮ Efficient allocations in economies with asymmetric information when the realized frequency of types is common knowledge ⋮ Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility ⋮ Conditional exact law of large numbers and asymmetric information economies with aggregate uncertainty ⋮ Equilibria and incentives in private information economies ⋮ Existence, incentive compatibility and efficiency of the rational expectations equilibrium ⋮ Equilibrium theory under ambiguity ⋮ Independent random matching ⋮ A bargaining model in general equilibrium ⋮ Randomization under ambiguity: efficiency and incentive compatibility ⋮ Monte Carlo simulation of macroeconomic risk with a continuum of agents: the general case ⋮ Core, equilibria and incentives in large asymmetric information economies ⋮ On existence of rich Fubini extensions ⋮ Individual risk and Lebesgue extension without aggregate uncertainty ⋮ Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces

Cites Work

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• Efficiency and incentive compatibility in differential information economies
• Perfect competition in asymmetric information economies: compatibility of efficiency and incentives
• The exact law of large numbers via Fubini extension and characterization of insurable risks
• Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Dependent Random Variables with Independent Subsets
• Monte Carlo simulation of macroeconomic risk with a continuum of agents: the symmetric case
• Equilibrium concepts in differential information economies
• Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility

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