Ex ante efficiency implies incentive compatibility

DOI10.1007/S00199-007-0261-4MaRDI QIDQ926232zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yeneng Sun, Nicholas C. Yannelis

Publication date 26 May 2008

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0261-4

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto efficiencyExact law of large numbersAsymmetric informationIncentive compatibilityNegligible private informationStrong conditional independence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic models in economics (91B70)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3249395 (Why is no real title available?)
• Dependent Random Variables with Independent Subsets
• Efficiency and incentive compatibility in differential information economies
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Equilibrium concepts in differential information economies
• Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility
• Monte Carlo simulation of macroeconomic risk with a continuum of agents: the symmetric case
• Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
• Perfect competition in asymmetric information economies: compatibility of efficiency and incentives
• The exact law of large numbers via Fubini extension and characterization of insurable risks

Cited in

(19)

• Monte Carlo sampling processes and incentive compatible allocations in large economies
• Core, equilibria and incentives in large asymmetric information economies
• Equilibrium theory under ambiguity
• Informational size and incentive compatibility with aggregate uncertainty.
• Asymptotic Efficiency in Large Exchange Economies With Asymmetric Information
• A dual characterization of incentive efficiency.
• Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces
• Efficient allocations in economies with asymmetric information when the realized frequency of types is common knowledge
• Conditional exact law of large numbers and asymmetric information economies with aggregate uncertainty
• Existence, incentive compatibility and efficiency of the rational expectations equilibrium
• A bargaining model in general equilibrium
• Randomization under ambiguity: efficiency and incentive compatibility
• Equilibria and incentives in private information economies
• Monte Carlo simulation of macroeconomic risk with a continuum of agents: the general case
• On existence of rich Fubini extensions
• Individual risk and Lebesgue extension without aggregate uncertainty
• Independent random matching
• Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility
• Perfect competition in asymmetric information economies: compatibility of efficiency and incentives

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