A dual characterization of incentive efficiency.

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00064-4MaRDI QIDQ1411030zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Belén Jerez

Publication date 15 October 2003

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

DualityLinear programmingAsymmetric informationIncentive efficiency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Recommendations

• Efficiency and incentive compatibility in differential information economies
• Incentive efficient price systems in large insurance economies with adverse selection
• Nonparametric adverse selection problems
• Equilibria and Pareto optimal of markets with adverse selection
• Ex ante efficiency implies incentive compatibility

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3637586 (Why is no real title available?)
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• A theory of hyperfinite processes: The complete removal of individual uncertainty via exact LLN
• An expository note on individual risk without aggregate uncertainty
• Competitive equilibria with asymmetric information
• Cooperative games with incomplete information
• Duality in semi-infinite programs and some works of Haar and Carathéodory
• General Competitive Analysis in an Economy with Private Information
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Linear functionals on spaces of continuous functions
• Lotteries, sunspots, and incentive constraints
• On Representations of Semi-Infinite Programs which Have No Duality Gaps
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
• Perfect competition in the continuous assignment model
• Recent contributions to linear semi-infinite optimization
• Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
• The law of large numbers with a continuum of i.i.d. random variables

Cited in

(13)

• Ex ante efficiency implies incentive compatibility
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1091161 (Why is no real title available?)
• Computing solutions to moral-hazard programs using the Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition algorithm
• Incentive problems with unidimensional hidden characteristics: a unified approach
• Competitive equilibrium with search frictions: a general equilibrium approach
• A dual approach to agency problems
• Verifiability and group formation in markets
• Price caps and efficiency in markets with adverse selection
• Efficiency of the rank-order incentive systems
• Futures market: contractual arrangement to restrain moral hazard in teams
• On signalling and screening in markets with asymmetric information
• Epsilon-efficiency in a dynamic partnership with adverse selection and moral hazard
• Detecting profitable deviations

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