Incentive problems with unidimensional hidden characteristics: a unified approach
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Publication:3587007
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Cited in
(14)- Voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules with a minimum-utility constraint
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 27323 (Why is no real title available?)
- An analysis of an incentive problem considering non‐monetary utility
- Insurance as a lemons market: coverage denials and pooling
- A generalization of the Atkinson-Stiglitz (1976) theorem on the undesirability of nonuniform excise taxation
- Ambiguity, optimism, and pessimism in adverse selection models
- Solving the income fluctuation problem with unbounded rewards
- On optimization of tax functions
- Optimal redistributive taxation with both extensive and intensive responses
- Redistribution with labor market frictions
- Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models
- Voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules
- Optimal contract design in the joint economic lot size problem with multi-dimensional asymmetric information
- Adverse selection without single crossing: monotone solutions
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