Voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.02.008zbMATH Open1393.91114OpenAlexW2278177576MaRDI QIDQ523014FDOQ523014

Authors Craig Brett, John A. Weymark

Publication date 20 April 2017

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.02.008

zbMATH Keywords

bunchingmajority votingnonlinear income taxationredistributive taxationironing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 716526 (Why is no real title available?)
• A First Course in Optimization Theory
• An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
• Bunching and second-order conditions: A note on optimal tax theory
• Disconnected optimal trajectories
• Distributional Effects of Linear Income Tax Schedules
• Incentive problems with unidimensional hidden characteristics: a unified approach
• Minimizing a Submodular Function on a Lattice
• Monopoly Provision of Quality and Warranties: An Exploration in the Theory of Multidimensional Screening
• Non-linear capital taxation without commitment
• On Income Distribution, Incentive Effects and Optimal Income Taxation
• On the optimality of optimal income taxation
• Optimal bunching without optimal control
• Optimal marginal and average income taxation under maximin
• Participation constraints in adverse selection models
• Some Properties of the Optimal Income-Tax
• Straightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large Economies
• Voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules with a minimum-utility constraint

Cited in

(9)

• Bunching properties of optimal nonlinear income taxes
• John A. Weymark
• Voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules with a minimum-utility constraint
• Voting over redistribution in the Meltzer-Richard model under interdependent labor inputs
• Taxation behind the veil of ignorance
• Majority rule and selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules with discrete skill levels
• Borda-optimal taxation of labour income
• Bunching in rank-dependent optimal income tax schedules
• Voting over selfishly optimal income tax schedules with tax-driven migrations

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