Monopoly Provision of Quality and Warranties: An Exploration in the Theory of Multidimensional Screening
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Publication:3750441
DOI10.2307/1913245zbMATH Open0609.90009OpenAlexW2084752608MaRDI QIDQ3750441FDOQ3750441
Authors:
Publication date: 1987
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/661.pdf
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Cited In (29)
- Market signaling with grades
- Majority rule and selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules with discrete skill levels
- Mechanism design for general screening problems with moral hazard
- Hamiltonian approach to multi-dimensional screening
- Warranties, moral hazard, and the lemons problem
- Optimal allocation and backup of computer resources under asymmetric information and incentive incompatibility
- Robust pooling for contracting models with asymmetric information
- Price and quality competition while envisioning a quality-related product recall
- Product warranty management. III: A review of mathematical models
- Incentive compatible strategies for general Stackelberg games with incomplete information
- Mechanism design with weaker incentive compatibility constraints
- Warranty pricing with consumer learning
- On the provision of product quality by a labor-managed monopolist
- On the implementability of contracts without quasilinear utility
- Conditions for incentive compatibility in models with multidimensional allocation functions and one-dimensional types
- Monotone comparative statics: geometric approach
- Screening by mode of trade
- Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication
- Adverse selection without single crossing: monotone solutions
- Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design
- Voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules
- Monotonicity in direct revelation mechanisms
- Non-linear pricing by convex duality
- OPTIMAL MULTIATTRIBUTE SCREENING
- On the strategic use of risk and undesirable goods in multidimensional screening
- The converse envelope theorem
- Strategic nonlinear income tax competition with perfect labor mobility
- Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
- Quality choice of multiproduct monopolist and spill-over effect
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