Warranties, moral hazard, and the lemons problem
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Publication:1106076
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(88)90147-0zbMATH Open0649.90028OpenAlexW2058097231MaRDI QIDQ1106076FDOQ1106076
Authors: Winand Emons 
Publication date: 1988
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(88)90147-0
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Cites Work
Cited In (11)
- Warranties, Durability, and Maintenance: Two-sided Moral Hazard in a Continuous-Time Model
- Advances in Bayesian decision making in reliability
- Quality, self-regulation, and competition: The case of insurance
- Product warranty management. III: A review of mathematical models
- Quality implications of warranties in a supply chain
- Quality as a substitute for quantity. Do more reliable products ever sell for less!
- Efficient regulated entry in competitive markets with demand uncertainty
- Decentralization versus coordination in competing supply chains under retailers' extended warranties
- The effect of product misperception on economic outcomes: evidence from the extended warranty market
- Analysis of product warranties based on two-sided adverse selection
- Warranty signalling and reputation
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