Quality, self-regulation, and competition: The case of insurance

DOI10.1016/S0167-6687(03)00111-2MaRDI QIDQ1413396zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Fredrik Andersson, Göran Skogh

Publication date 16 November 2003

Published in Insurance Mathematics \& Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-6687(03)00111-2

zbMATH Keywords

competitioncredibility externalitiesgenerosityself-regulation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of statistics to actuarial sciences and financial mathematics (62P05)

Recommendations

• A model of self-regulation
• Insurance monopoly and renegotiation
• An evolutionary analysis of insurance markets with adverse selection.
• Insuring nonverifiable losses
• Price regulation in insurance markets with asymmetric information

Cites work

• A Theory of Collective Reputations (with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality)
• Game theory
• Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• On Moral Hazard and Insurance
• Renegotiation in repeated games
• Variance Analysis Procedures as Motivational Devices
• Warranties, moral hazard, and the lemons problem

Cited in

(4)

• Risk diversifying treaty between two companies with only one in insurance business
• Self-Regulation and Government Oversight
• A model of self-regulation
• Adverse selection and bilateral asymmetric information

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