A Theory of Collective Reputations (with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality)
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Publication:4865749
DOI10.2307/2298112zbMATH Open0841.90022OpenAlexW1590632185MaRDI QIDQ4865749FDOQ4865749
Authors: Jean Tirole 
Publication date: 24 July 1996
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/64174
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Cited In (18)
- Informal incentive labour contracts and product market competition
- Fragility of reputation and clustering of risk-taking
- Quality, self-regulation, and competition: The case of insurance
- Paying it forward: an experimental study on social connections and indirect reciprocity
- The incidence and persistence of corruption in economic development
- Collective reputation and the dynamics of statistical discrimination
- Farsighted clustering with group-size effects and reputations
- A Reputation Game Simulation: Emergent Social Phenomena from Information Theory
- Long-term relationships as safeguards
- On the cultural transmission of corruption
- Cracking down on bribery
- Corruption across countries and regions: some consequences of local osmosis
- Evolutionary dynamics of compliance in a two-population game of auditors and taxpayers
- Corruption and power in democracies
- The dynamics of collective reputation
- Social norms and trust among strangers
- Voluntary contributions by consent or dissent
- The signaling value of punishing norm-breakers and rewarding norm-followers
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