A Theory of Collective Reputations (with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality)

DOI10.2307/2298112MaRDI QIDQ4865749zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jean Tirole

Publication date 24 July 1996

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/64174

zbMATH Keywords

group reputation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

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Cited in

(18)

• The incidence and persistence of corruption in economic development
• Cracking down on bribery
• The dynamics of collective reputation
• Social norms and trust among strangers
• Corruption across countries and regions: some consequences of local osmosis
• Informal incentive labour contracts and product market competition
• Paying it forward: an experimental study on social connections and indirect reciprocity
• A Reputation Game Simulation: Emergent Social Phenomena from Information Theory
• Farsighted clustering with group-size effects and reputations
• Quality, self-regulation, and competition: The case of insurance
• The signaling value of punishing norm-breakers and rewarding norm-followers
• Evolutionary dynamics of compliance in a two-population game of auditors and taxpayers
• On the cultural transmission of corruption
• Fragility of reputation and clustering of risk-taking
• Long-term relationships as safeguards
• Corruption and power in democracies
• Voluntary contributions by consent or dissent
• Collective reputation and the dynamics of statistical discrimination

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