A "Reputation" Refinement without Equilibrium
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Publication:5289306
DOI10.2307/2951784zbMath0778.90105OpenAlexW2156758485MaRDI QIDQ5289306
Publication date: 22 August 1993
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2951784
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