An experiment on learning with limited information: nonconvergence, experimentation cascades, and the advantage of being slow.
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Publication:1885437
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00183-0zbMath1068.91009MaRDI QIDQ1885437
Eric J. Friedman, Mikhael Shor, Barry Sopher, Scott J. Shenker
Publication date: 28 October 2004
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items
Learning strategic environments: An experimental study of strategy formation and transfer, Aspiration adaptation in the ultimatum minigame., Learning under limited information., An experimental evaluation of the serial cost sharing rule
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