Payoff assessments without probabilities: a simple dynamic model of choice

DOI10.1006/game.1998.0702zbMath1115.91311OpenAlexW1985191333WikidataQ57918043 ScholiaQ57918043MaRDI QIDQ1304012

Rajiv Sarin, Farshid Vahid

Publication date: 5 December 1999

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0702

zbMATH Keywords

learningmaxminprocedural rationalitypayoff assessments without probabilities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Social choice (91B14) Decision theory for games (91A35)

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