"Beliefs about Beliefs" without Probabilities

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Publication:5689664

DOI10.2307/2171834zbMath0862.90020OpenAlexW2056526024MaRDI QIDQ5689664

Larry G. Epstein, Tan Wang

Publication date: 7 January 1997

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/9db59b0fb229c171cf01688d954e7ddfd866419b




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