Extensive form games with uncertainty averse players
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Publication:1304010
DOI10.1006/game.1998.0696zbMath1115.91309OpenAlexW2001379921MaRDI QIDQ1304010
Publication date: 5 December 1999
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/6a09ac013f84a72a5c6bd97c4a9a2ccbe1ddf54e
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