Rational play in extensive-form games

DOI10.3390/g13060072zbMath1519.91037OpenAlexW4307947793MaRDI QIDQ6105146

Giacomo Bonanno

Publication date: 26 June 2023

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g13060072

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumbehavioral modelmaterial rationalityself-confirming play

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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