Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1867531
DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2942zbMath1038.91013OpenAlexW2038925917MaRDI QIDQ1867531
Marciano Siniscalchi, Pierpaolo Battigalli
Publication date: 2 April 2003
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/4e55c8a2ee4a18287e317b9c1eebff7890812519
Games in extensive form (91A18) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
Related Items (only showing first 100 items - show all)
An epistemic approach to explaining cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoner's dilemma ⋮ Choice-driven counterfactuals ⋮ Admissibility and assumption ⋮ Dynamic interactive epistemology ⋮ Common belief in rationality in psychological games. Belief-dependent utility and the limits of strategic reasoning ⋮ Imperfect recognizability and coexistence of money and higher-return assets ⋮ When do type structures contain all hierarchies of beliefs? ⋮ Lexicographic probability, conditional probability, and nonstandard probability ⋮ Universality of the Epstein-Wang type structure ⋮ The equivalence of Bayes and causal rationality in games ⋮ Subjective reasoning -- dynamic games ⋮ Subjective reasoning -- solutions ⋮ Why forward induction leads to the backward induction outcome: a new proof for Battigalli's theorem ⋮ Rationalizability and logical inference ⋮ Proper belief revision and rationalizability in dynamic games ⋮ CONDITIONAL BELIEFS: FROM NEIGHBOURHOOD SEMANTICS TO SEQUENT CALCULUS ⋮ Belief distorted Nash equilibria: introduction of a new kind of equilibrium in dynamic games with distorted information ⋮ An impossibility theorem on beliefs in games ⋮ Forward induction reasoning and correct beliefs ⋮ Characterizing solution concepts in terms of common knowledge of rationality ⋮ Uncertain information structures and backward induction ⋮ Vagueness in multidimensional proposals ⋮ On common belief in future rationality in games with ambiguous orderings of information sets ⋮ The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology ⋮ Signaling Games ⋮ Epistemic game theory without types structures: an application to psychological games ⋮ On non-monotonic strategic reasoning ⋮ An epistemic analysis of dynamic games with unawareness ⋮ On the non-existence of stable matches with incomplete information ⋮ Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning ⋮ Admissibility and common belief. ⋮ Robust dynamic implementation ⋮ A topological approach to full belief ⋮ An epistemic approach to stochastic games ⋮ Forward induction equilibrium ⋮ The logic of backward induction ⋮ Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players ⋮ A Qualitative Theory of Dynamic Interactive Belief Revision ⋮ Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior ⋮ Belief in the opponents' future rationality ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ On the epistemic foundation for iterated weak dominance: an analysis in a logic of individual and collective attitudes ⋮ Editorial: Weighted logics for artificial intelligence -- an introductory discussion ⋮ Minimal belief revision leads to backward induction ⋮ Opportunistic conformism ⋮ Hierarchies of ambiguous beliefs ⋮ Proper belief revision and equilibrium in dynamic games ⋮ Conditional belief types ⋮ Rationalizability and epistemic priority orderings ⋮ Rethinking common belief, revision, and backward induction ⋮ Full implementation in backward induction ⋮ The context of the game ⋮ A minimal logic for interactive epistemology ⋮ Epistemic logic meets epistemic game theory: a comparison between multi-agent Kripke models and type spaces ⋮ Irrationality and ambiguity in extensive games ⋮ King of the Hill: giving backward induction its best shot ⋮ Bayesian updating rules and AGM belief revision ⋮ Limited focus in dynamic games ⋮ Preference-based belief operators ⋮ Self-admissible sets ⋮ On the outcome equivalence of backward induction and extensive form rationalizability ⋮ Reasoning about rationality ⋮ Modeling reasoning in a social setting ⋮ Epistemic equivalence of extended belief hierarchies ⋮ Common belief in future and restricted past rationality ⋮ A rational way of playing: revision theory for strategic interaction ⋮ When do types induce the same belief hierarchy? ⋮ Perfect forward induction ⋮ On dynamic consistency in ambiguous games ⋮ Robust virtual implementation under common strong belief in rationality ⋮ Dynamic psychological games ⋮ From iterated revision to iterated contraction: extending the Harper identity ⋮ Strategic cautiousness as an expression of robustness to ambiguity ⋮ Interactive epistemology in simple dynamic games with a continuum of strategies ⋮ Beliefs, plans, and perceived intentions in dynamic games ⋮ RATIONALIZATION IN SIGNALING GAMES: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS ⋮ Iterated dominance revisited ⋮ Discovery and equilibrium in games with unawareness ⋮ Updating confidence in beliefs ⋮ Keep `hoping' for rationality: a solution to the backward induction paradox ⋮ Common theories ⋮ Informational robustness of common belief in rationality ⋮ Beyond Normal Form Invariance: First Mover Advantage in Two-Stage Games with or without Predictable Cheap Talk ⋮ Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games ⋮ Simple unawareness in dynamic psychological games ⋮ Strong forward induction ⋮ Agreeing to disagree with conditional probability systems ⋮ Prudent rationalizability in generalized extensive-form games with unawareness ⋮ From Lawvere to Brandenburger-Keisler: interactive forms of diagonalization and self-reference ⋮ Bayesian persuasion in unlinked games ⋮ Tenable threats when Nash equilibrium is the norm ⋮ Backward induction versus forward induction reasoning ⋮ Toward a theory of play: a logical perspective on games and interaction ⋮ A doxastic behavioral characterization of generalized backward induction ⋮ Transparent Restrictions on Beliefs and Forward-Induction Reasoning in Games with Asymmetric Information ⋮ Implementation without incentive compatibility: two stories with partially informed planners ⋮ Solution concepts of principal-agent models with unawareness of actions ⋮ On the epistemic foundation for backward induction ⋮ Linear Riley equilibria in quadratic signaling games
Cites Work
- Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
- Hierarchies of conditional beliefs and interactive epistemology in dynamic games
- Fixed-equilibrium rationalizability in signaling games
- Belief revision in games: Forward and backward induction
- On rationalizability in extensive games
- Admissibility and common belief.
- Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
- Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
- Strategic rationality orderings and the best rationalization principle
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- On a new axiomatic theory of probability
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- Backward Induction, Normal Form Perfection and Explicable Equilibria
- Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backwards Induction in Perfect- Information Games
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
- Self-Confirming Equilibrium
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
This page was built for publication: Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.
