Recommendations
Cites work
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- Conditional dominance, rationalizability, and game forms
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- Fixed-equilibrium rationalizability in signaling games
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- Robust dynamic implementation
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Cited in
(9)- Strategic candidacy, monotonicity, and strategy-proofness
- Order independence for rationalizability
- Transparent restrictions on beliefs and forward-induction reasoning in games with asymmetric information
- Nonmyopic Strategic Behavior in the MDP Planning Procedure
- Monotonicity and robust implementation under forward-induction reasoning
- Logic Programming and Nonmonotonic Reasoning
- The epistemic spirit of divinity
- Rationalizability and epistemic priority orderings
- Rationalizability and epistemic priority orderings
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