Strategic rationality orderings and the best rationalization principle
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Publication:1919677
DOI10.1006/game.1996.0033zbMath0851.90147OpenAlexW1995347856MaRDI QIDQ1919677
Publication date: 25 November 1996
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0033
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