A doxastic behavioral characterization of generalized backward induction
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Publication:2345218
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.10.004zbMath1311.91024OpenAlexW2090350012MaRDI QIDQ2345218
Publication date: 19 May 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/2sf6r7p5
rationalitybehavioral modelextensive-form gamedynamic interactive beliefsgeneralized backward induction
Games in extensive form (91A18) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Dynamic games (91A25) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)
Related Items
Choice-driven counterfactuals, Rational play in extensive-form games, Beliefs, plans, and perceived intentions in dynamic games
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