The order independence of iterated dominance in extensive games
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Publication:4586119
DOI10.3982/TE942zbMath1395.91036MaRDI QIDQ4586119
Publication date: 11 September 2018
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
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