The order independence of iterated dominance in extensive games
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- An extensive game as a guide for solving a normal game
- Common belief in future and restricted past rationality
- Prudent rationalizability in generalized extensive-form games with unawareness
- On non-monotonic strategic reasoning
- Iterated elimination procedures
- Studying strategies and types of players: experiments, logics and cognitive models
- On the outcome equivalence of backward induction and extensive form rationalizability
- A doxastic behavioral characterization of generalized backward induction
- Belief in the opponents' future rationality
- Iterated strict dominance in general games
- Iterated weak dominance and subgame dominance
- What drives people's choices in turn-taking games, if not game-theoretic rationality?
- Rethinking common belief, revision, and backward induction
- Do players reason by forward induction in dynamic perfect information games?
- Robust virtual implementation under common strong belief in rationality
- Order independence for rationalizability
- Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions
- The logic of backward induction
- On the order of eliminating dominated strategies
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