Prudent rationalizability in generalized extensive-form games with unawareness

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2020-2013MaRDI QIDQ2099077zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Aviad Heifetz, Martin Meier, Burkhard C. Schipper

Publication date 22 November 2022

Published in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2020-2013

zbMATH Keywords

cautioncommon strong cautious belief in rationalitydisclosureextensive-form rationalizabilityiterated admissibilitypersuasion gamesunawarenessverifiable information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Recommendations

• Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior
• Extensive games with possibly unaware players
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Cites work

• Backward Induction, Normal Form Perfection and Explicable Equilibria
• Bayesian games with unawareness and unawareness perfection
• Conditional dominance, rationalizability, and game forms
• Discovery and equilibrium in games with unawareness
• Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior
• Extensive games with possibly unaware players
• Generalized solution concepts in games with possibly unaware players
• Incorporating unawareness into contract theory
• Inductive reasoning about unawareness
• Lexicographic Probabilities and Choice Under Uncertainty
• Lexicographic rationalizability and iterated admissibility
• On rationalizability in extensive games
• On the outcome equivalence of backward induction and extensive form rationalizability
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• RATIONALIZATION IN SIGNALING GAMES: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS
• Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games
• Strategic rationality orderings and the best rationalization principle
• Strategic reasoning in persuasion games: an experiment
• Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.
• The order independence of iterated dominance in extensive games
• Unawareness -- a gentle introduction to both the literature and the special issue
• Why forward induction leads to the backward induction outcome: a new proof for Battigalli's theorem

Cited in

(14)

• Testing minimax for rational ignorant agents
• Discovery and equilibrium in games with unawareness
• Introduction to the special issue on unawareness
• Delegation and information disclosure with unforeseen contingencies
• Strategic reasoning in persuasion games: an experiment
• An epistemic analysis of dynamic games with unawareness
• Farsighted rationality in hedonic games
• Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness
• Rationalizable self-confirming equilibrium in static games with unawareness
• Implicit knowledge in unawareness structures
• Level-k thinking in the extensive form
• Unraveling of product information with discrete prices
• Disclosure of product information after price competition
• Kuhn's theorem for games of the extensive form with unawareness

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