Prudent rationalizability in generalized extensive-form games with unawareness
DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2020-2013OpenAlexW3035627063MaRDI QIDQ2099077FDOQ2099077
Authors: Aviad Heifetz, Martin Meier, Burkhard C. Schipper 
Publication date: 22 November 2022
Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2020-2013
Recommendations
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Cites Work
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- RATIONALIZATION IN SIGNALING GAMES: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS
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- Discovery and equilibrium in games with unawareness
- Strategic reasoning in persuasion games: an experiment
Cited In (9)
- Introduction to the special issue on unawareness
- Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness
- Farsighted rationality in hedonic games
- Delegation and information disclosure with unforeseen contingencies
- Testing minimax for rational ignorant agents
- Discovery and equilibrium in games with unawareness
- An epistemic analysis of dynamic games with unawareness
- Rationalizable self-confirming equilibrium in static games with unawareness
- Strategic reasoning in persuasion games: an experiment
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