On rationalizability in extensive games

DOI10.1006/jeth.1996.2252zbMath0887.90185OpenAlexW2005618319MaRDI QIDQ1367906

Publication date: 6 May 1998

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.2252

zbMATH Keywords

backward induction iterated weak dominance extensive form rationalizability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

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