On rationalizability in extensive games
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Publication:1367906
DOI10.1006/JETH.1996.2252zbMATH Open0887.90185OpenAlexW2005618319MaRDI QIDQ1367906FDOQ1367906
Authors: Pierpaolo Battigalli 
Publication date: 6 May 1998
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.2252
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