A structure theorem for rationalizability in the normal form of dynamic games
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2012.02.006zbMATH Open1239.91015OpenAlexW2021130486MaRDI QIDQ423726FDOQ423726
Authors: Yi-Chun Chen 
Publication date: 4 June 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.006
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robustnessincomplete informationhigher-order beliefsrationalizabilityextensive-form gamesuniversal type space
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Cites Work
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- Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
- Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
- Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.
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- A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements
- On the robustness of equilibrium refinements
- Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty
- Higher order uncertainty and information: static and dynamic games
- Critical types
- Extensive Games
- Conditional dominance, rationalizability, and game forms
- Hierarchies of conditional beliefs and interactive epistemology in dynamic games
- Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backwards Induction in Perfect- Information Games
- Sensitivity of equilibrium behavior to higher-order beliefs in nice games
- Title not available (Why is that?)
Cited In (5)
- Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies
- The robust selection of rationalizability
- Robust refinement of rationalizability with arbitrary payoff uncertainty
- On the generic robustness of solution concepts to incomplete information
- Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs
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