A structure theorem for rationalizability in the normal form of dynamic games
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Publication:423726
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.006zbMath1239.91015MaRDI QIDQ423726
Publication date: 4 June 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.006
robustness; incomplete information; rationalizability; universal type space; higher-order beliefs; extensive-form games
Related Items
The robust selection of rationalizability, Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs, On the generic robustness of solution concepts to incomplete information, Robust refinement of rationalizability with arbitrary payoff uncertainty, Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies
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