A structure theorem for rationalizability in the normal form of dynamic games

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2012.02.006MaRDI QIDQ423726zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yi-Chun Chen

Publication date 4 June 2012

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.006

zbMATH Keywords

robustnessincomplete informationhigher-order beliefsrationalizabilityextensive-form gamesuniversal type space

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Dynamic games (91A25) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3302001 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements
• A course in game theory.
• Common belief foundations of global games
• Conditional dominance, rationalizability, and game forms
• Critical types
• Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.
• Extensive Games
• Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
• Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
• Hierarchies of conditional beliefs and interactive epistemology in dynamic games
• Higher order uncertainty and information: static and dynamic games
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• On the robustness of equilibrium refinements
• Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty
• Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backwards Induction in Perfect- Information Games
• Real Analysis and Probability
• Sensitivity of equilibrium behavior to higher-order beliefs in nice games

Cited in

(6)

• Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies
• The robust selection of rationalizability
• Robust refinement of rationalizability with arbitrary payoff uncertainty
• Structural rationality in dynamic games
• Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs
• On the generic robustness of solution concepts to incomplete information

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