On the robustness of equilibrium refinements
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Cites work
- A relation between perfect equilibria in extensive form games and proper equilibria in normal form games
- An Approach to Communication Equilibria
- Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
- Multistage Games with Communication
- On stability of perfect equilibrium points
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
- Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
- Sequential Equilibria
- Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
Cited in
(46)- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4123556 (Why is no real title available?)
- THE ROBUSTNESS OF EQUILIBRIA ON CONVEX SOLIDS
- Nash blocks
- Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games
- A revelation principle for correlated equilibrium under trembling-hand perfection
- Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
- Local perfection
- Perturbed finitely repeated games
- On self-enforcement in extensive-form games
- Patent Nash equilibria in symmetric strictly competitive games
- Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty
- Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria
- Strong robustness to incomplete information and the uniqueness of a correlated equilibrium
- Nash refinements of equilibria
- An ``informationally robust equilibrium for two-person nonzero-sum games
- Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1841936 (Why is no real title available?)
- On rationalizability in extensive games
- Refinement of proper equilibrium points
- The robust selection of rationalizability
- On the inconsistency of equilibrium refinement
- Robust equilibria under non-common priors
- Fall back equilibrium
- Robust refinement of rationalizability with arbitrary payoff uncertainty
- On `informationally robust equilibria' for bimatrix games
- Commitment and observability in games
- Can evolutionary dynamics explain free riding in experiments?
- Epsilon-equilibria of perturbed games
- Reputation with observed actions
- A structure theorem for rationalizability in the normal form of dynamic games
- Rational behavior under correlated uncertainty
- Stable equilibria and forward induction
- Tenacious selection of Nash equilibrium
- Epistemically robust strategy subsets
- Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs
- The theory of normal form games from the differentiable viewpoint
- Robust Wardrop Equilibrium
- Is having a unique equilibrium robust?
- Generalized backward induction: justification for a folk algorithm
- Self-confirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique
- Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness
- Perfectly almost strict equilibria for finite games in strategic form
- Continuous implementation with payoff knowledge
- Weakly strict equilibria in finite normal form games
- A necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for playing backward induction
- Ideal reactive equilibrium
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