On the robustness of equilibrium refinements (Q1112743)

Nash equilibrium points in finite n-person normal form games are examined from the standpoint of intuitive rationality. A concept of ``strict'' equilibrium is introduced in the following way: a Nash equilibrium is strict if for each player his strategy is a unique best response to the other players' strategies. Supposing that the knowledge of the game structure is not absolute (uncertainty about payoffs and strategies), it is reasonable to look for a robust concept of equilibrium which preserves equilibrium properties for a family of ``close'' games. A concept of ``near strictness'' is suggested: Nash equilibria of a given game, which are limit points of strict equilibria of a sequence of ``close'' games over the same normal form are called near strict. It is shown that every pure strategy Nash equilibrium is near strict. The concept of near strict equilibrium is used for the analysis of extensive form games with incomplete information.