The robust selection of rationalizability
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Publication:402092
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2014.02.001zbMath1296.91046OpenAlexW2009257440MaRDI QIDQ402092
Satoru Takahashi, Siyang Xiong, Yi-Chun Chen
Publication date: 27 August 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.02.001
Related Items (3)
Continuous implementation with local payoff uncertainty ⋮ Approximate robustness of equilibrium to incomplete information ⋮ Robust refinement of rationalizability with arbitrary payoff uncertainty
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