The robust selection of rationalizability

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2014.02.001zbMATH Open1296.91046OpenAlexW2009257440MaRDI QIDQ402092FDOQ402092

Authors: Yi-Chun Chen, Satoru Takahashi, Siyang Xiong 

Publication date: 27 August 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.02.001

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zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium refinemente-mail gameglobal gamerobust selectionWY selection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

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• Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior
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• The e-mail game phenomenon
• Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty
• Continuous implementation
• Robustness to incomplete information in repeated games
• Epsilon-equilibria of perturbed games
• A structure theorem for rationalizability in the normal form of dynamic games
• Coordinating Regime Switches
• Critical types
• Approximate robustness of equilibrium to incomplete information
• When do type structures contain all hierarchies of beliefs?
• Robust equilibria under non-common priors

Cited In (5)

• Robust refinement of rationalizability with arbitrary payoff uncertainty
• Approximate robustness of equilibrium to incomplete information
• A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Continuous implementation with local payoff uncertainty

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