The e-mail game phenomenon

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.02.010MaRDI QIDQ2435897zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yi-Chun Chen, Siyang Xiong

Publication date 21 February 2014

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.010

zbMATH Keywords

common knowledgecritical typese-mail gamegames with incomplete informationhigher-order beliefs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Recommendations

• Coordinated action in the electronic mail game
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 795169
• Efficient communication in the electronic mail game
• Correlation in the multiplayer electronic mail game
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 998060
• Coordination in an email game without ``Almost common knowledge
• Efficiency and equilibrium in the electronic mail game; the general case

Cites work

• A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements
• Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
• Critical types
• Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
• Genericity and robustness of full surplus extraction
• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
• Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
• On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design
• Rationalizable bidding in first-price auctions.
• Rationalizable trade
• Uniform topologies on types

Cited in

(4)

• THE E-MAIL GAME REVISITED — MODELING ROUGH INDUCTIVE REASONING
• The robust selection of rationalizability
• Value‐based distance between information structures
• Continuous implementation with local payoff uncertainty

This page was built for publication: The e-mail game phenomenon

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2435897)