Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
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- Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.
- Iterated generalized half-dominance and global game selection
- Characterising equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities
- Uniform selection in global games
- A dominance solvable global game with strategic substitutes
Cited in
(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Coordinating under incomplete information
- Perfect foresight and equilibrium selection in symmetric potential games
- On the relationship between risk-dominance and stochastic stability
- Common \(p\)-belief: The general case
- Incentive monotonicity and equilibrium selection in \(2\times 2\) matrix games
- Communication, risk, and efficiency in games
- Switching costs in frequently repeated games.
- Moral hazard and private monitoring
- Evolutionary games and matching rules
- Games with the total bandwagon property meet the Quint-Shubik conjecture
- Government guarantees and financial stability
- Financial contracting with enforcement externalities
- Coordination and private information revelation
- Sovereign risk, bank funding and investors' pessimism
- Illegal migration and policy enforcement
- Rationalization and identification of binary games with correlated types
- Inspired and inspiring: Hervé Moulin and the discovery of the beauty contest game
- Dynamic coordination among heterogeneous agents
- Coordination and social learning
- Overthrowing the dictator: a game-theoretic approach to revolutions and media
- On the equivalence of robustness to canonical and general elaborations
- Regime change in large information networks
- On the generic robustness of solution concepts to incomplete information
- Receiver's dilemma
- Contagion of self-fulfilling financial crises due to diversification of investment portfolios
- Network formation and social coordination
- Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.
- Public information, private information, and the multiplicity of equilibria in coordination games.
- \(p\)-dominance and equilibrium selection under perfect foresight dynamics.
- History as a coordination device
- Learning a population distribution
- Experimental evidence of bank runs as pure coordination failures
- Correlation and coordination risk
- On the beliefs off the path: equilibrium refinement due to quantal response and level-\(k\)
- The effect of endogenous timing on coordination under asymmetric information: an experimental study
- Regime change games with an active defender
- Rollover risk and stress test credibility
- The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender's preferences are state independent
- Deterrence by collective punishment may work against criminals but never against freedom fighters
- Modeling players with random ``data access
- Reciprocity with uncertainty about others
- Epistemological implementation of social choice functions
- Robust refinement of rationalizability with arbitrary payoff uncertainty
- Interaction patterns and coordination in two population groups: a dynamic perspective
- The value of a coordination game
- Continuous implementation with direct revelation mechanisms
- Strong robustness to incomplete information and the uniqueness of a correlated equilibrium
- The normality assumption in coordination games with flexible information acquisition
- On the cardinality of the message space in sender-receiver games
- Sentiments, strategic uncertainty, and information structures in coordination games
- Repeated coordination with private learning
- The role of large players in global games with strategic complements and substitutes
- Rational inattention and the monotone likelihood ratio property
- Coordinated bubbles and crashes
- The emergence of cooperation through leadership
- Prisoners' other dilemma
- Clock games: theory and experiments
- Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria
- Global games with strategic complements and substitutes
- Robust multiplicity with (transfinitely) vanishing naiveté
- Possibilistic randomisation in strategic-form games
- Third-person effect and financial contagion in the context of a global game
- When will party whips succeed? Evidence from almost symmetric voting games
- When do creditors with heterogeneous beliefs agree to run?
- Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders
- A dominance solvable global game with strategic substitutes
- Efficient ex-ante stabilization of firms
- Coordination and delay in global games
- Monotone equilibria in Bayesian games of strategic complementarities
- A global game with strategic substitutes and complements
- Resolving indeterminacy in coordination games: A new approach applied to a pay-as-you-go pension scheme
- Defending against speculative attacks: the policy Maker's reputation
- Private provision of discrete public goods: the correlated cost case
- ``But everybody's doing it!: a model of peer effects on student cheating
- Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations
- Tractable dynamic global games and applications
- Characterising equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities
- Noise-independent selection in multidimensional global games
- The e-mail game phenomenon
- Perfect equilibrium in games with compact action spaces
- Saddle functions and robust sets of equilibria
- Beliefs and rationalizability in games with complementarities
- Robustness to strategic uncertainty
- Risk-sharing and crises. Global games of regime change with endogenous wealth
- Group play in games and the role of consent in network formation
- Iterated strict dominance in general games
- Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: an experimental study
- Coordination of mobile labor
- Uniform selection in global games
- An evolutionary analysis of the volunteer's dilemma
- Complementarities and macroeconomics: Poisson games
- An experimental study of costly coordination
- Risk-dominance and perfect foresight dynamics in \(N\)-player games
- Ambiguity and perceived coordination in a global game
- Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria
- Equilibrium and government commitment
- Coordination under limited depth of reasoning
- Public information and global games with strategic complements and substitutes
- Communication and cooperation in prisoner's dilemma games
- Characterizing robust solutions in monotone games
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