A dominance solvable global game with strategic substitutes
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2347916
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.01.001zbMath1319.91041OpenAlexW2039945802MaRDI QIDQ2347916
Pedro Jara-Moroni, Rodrigo Harrison
Publication date: 10 June 2015
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.economia.uc.cl/docs/dt_440.pdf
Related Items
The role of large players in global games with strategic complements and substitutes, Robust multiplicity with (transfinitely) vanishing naiveté
Cites Work
- Expectational coordination in simple economic contexts. Concepts and analysis with emphasis on strategic substituabilities
- Noise-independent selection in global games and monotone potential maximizer: a symmetric \(3 \times 3\) example
- On the relationship between robustness to incomplete information and noise-independent selection in global games
- Every symmetric \(3 \times 3\) global game of strategic complementarities has noise-independent selection
- Contagion of self-fulfilling financial crises due to diversification of investment portfolios
- Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.
- A fixed point characterization of the dominance-solvability of lattice games with strategic substitutes
- Characterising equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities
- Noise-independent selection in multidimensional global games
- Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
- Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
- Coordinating Regime Switches
- Anchoring Economic Predictions in Common Knowledge
