Every symmetric \(3 \times 3\) global game of strategic complementarities has noise-independent selection

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.10.004zbMath1273.91085OpenAlexW1497602759MaRDI QIDQ660107

Tijmen R. Daniëls, Christian Basteck

Publication date: 25 January 2012

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.10.004

zbMATH Keywords

supermodular gamestrategic complementaritiesglobal gamenoise-independent selection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games involving topology, set theory, or logic (91A44)

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Cites Work

• Noise-independent selection in global games and monotone potential maximizer: a symmetric \(3 \times 3\) example
• On the relationship between robustness to incomplete information and noise-independent selection in global games
• Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
• Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.
• Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria
• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
• The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information