Every symmetric 3 3 global game of strategic complementarities has noise-independent selection

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2011.10.004zbMATH Open1273.91085OpenAlexW1497602759MaRDI QIDQ660107FDOQ660107

Authors Christian Basteck, Tijmen R. Daniëls 

Publication date 25 January 2012

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.10.004

zbMATH Keywords

supermodular gamestrategic complementaritiesglobal gamenoise-independent selection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games involving topology, set theory, or logic (91A44)

Recommendations

• Noise-independent selection in global games and monotone potential maximizer: a symmetric \(3 \times 3\) example
• Characterising equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities
• On the relationship between robustness to incomplete information and noise-independent selection in global games
• Noise-independent selection in multidimensional global games
• Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.

Cites Work

• Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.
• Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria
• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
• Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
• Noise-independent selection in global games and monotone potential maximizer: a symmetric \(3 \times 3\) example
• On the relationship between robustness to incomplete information and noise-independent selection in global games
• The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information

Cited In (7)

• Noise-independent selection in multidimensional global games
• A dominance solvable global game with strategic substitutes
• Games with the total bandwagon property meet the Quint-Shubik conjecture
• Characterising equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities
• Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.
• Contagion and uninvadability in local interaction games: the bilingual game and general supermodular games
• Noise-independent selection in global games and monotone potential maximizer: a symmetric \(3 \times 3\) example

This page was built for publication: Every symmetric \(3 \times 3\) global game of strategic complementarities has noise-independent selection

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q660107)